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INTRODUCTION
The automatic stay' is undeniably one of the most important ele-
ments of the bankruptcy process.2 In fact, the expansion of the stay was
one of the major changes that the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act initi-
ated.3 Despite the integral nature of the automatic stay, however, courts
have yet to reach a consensus regarding the conceptualization and sub-
sequent effect of actions taken in violation of the stay. Presently, a sub-
stantial majority of the circuits hold that such actions are void ab initio
and of no legal effect.4 A small but significant number of courts, how-
L. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988).
2. See In re Lampkin, 116 Bankr. 450, 453 (Bankr. D. Md. 1990) (calling the stay "a bedrock
policy upon which the Code is built"). See also Grady v. A.H. Robins Co., 839 i.2d 198, 200 (4th
Cir. 1988) (stating that "the importance of § 362 cannot be over-emphasized").
3. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 to 1330 (1988). For a brief discus-
sion of the nature of this expansion, see Daniel Keating, Offensive Uses of the Automatic Stay, 45
Vand. L. Rev. 71, 75 (1992).
4. The First, Second, Third, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits all currently hold
that violations of the stay are void. See In re Smith Corset Shops, Inc., 696 F.2d 971 (1st Cir.
1982); In re 48th Street Steakhouse, Inc., 835 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1987); Maritime Elec. Co. v.
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ever, decline to follow the majority rule. These courts instead hold that
violations of the stay are voidable and capable of cure.5
The debate between the advocates of these two opposing rules can
best be understood as a conflict between bankruptcy policy concerns, on
the one hand, and the demand for coherent Code interpretation on the
other." The proponents of the void rule, relying mainly upon policy con-
cerns, argue that courts should hold stay violations absolutely void in
order to deter such violations, and thereby further the overriding pro-
tective purposes of the automatic stay.7 The proponents of the voidable
rule, however, argue that such a characterization is overly broad, inflex-
ible, and inconsistent with various provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.
The voidable rule advocates contend that the voidable rule is a statuto-
rily consistent and theoretically superior alternative.8 The caselaw has
consistently presented the void-voidable controversy as a conflict be-
tween these two opposing viewpoints.9 As a result, the debate thus far
United Jersey Bank, 959 F.2d 1194 (3d Cir. 1991); In re Ward, 837 F.2d 124 (3d Cir. 1988); Smith
v. First American Bank, N.A., 876 F.2d 524 (6th Cir. 1989); Ellis v. Consolidated Diesel Elec.
Corp., 894 F.2d 371 (10th Cir. 1990); In re Albany Partners, Ltd., 749 F.2d 670 (l1th Cir. 1984);
Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Hall, 685 F.2d 1306 (11th Cir. 1982).
The Ninth Circuit was, for a short period, in a state of relative uncertainty on this issue. Prior
to 1990, the Ninth Circuit courts had consistently held stay violations void. See In re Taylor, 884
F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1989); In re Shamblin, 890 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1989); In re Stringer, 847 F.2d
549, 551 (9th Cir. 1988); In re Sambo's Restaurants, Inc., 754 F.2d 811, 816 (9th Cir. 1985); In re
Wingo, 89 Bankr. 54 (9th Cir. (BAP) 1988). In 1990, however, the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Ap-
pellate Panel concluded that, for various reasons of statutory consistency, the Ninth Circuit deci-
sions actually supported the position that violations of the stay are voidable, not void. See In re
Schwartz, 119 Bankr. 207, 209-11 (9th Cir. 1990). Other courts criticized this fairly liberal interpre-
tation of Ninth Circuit precedent. See, for example, In re Williams, 124 Bankr. 311 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 1991), and ultimately the decision was reversed. See In re Schwartz, 954 F.2d 569 (9th Cir.
1992). With this decision, the Ninth Circuit once again clearly supports the void rule. Id. at 571.
Lower courts that have followed the void rule include the following: In re Advent Corp., 24
Bankr. 612 (1st Cir. 1982); Anglemyer v. United States, 115 Bankr. 510 (D. Md. 1990); Matter of
Dexter, 116 Bankr. 92 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990); In re Clark, 69 Bankr. 885 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987);
In re Davis, 74 Bankr. 406 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987); In re Funket, 27 Bankr. 640 (Bankr. M.D. Pa.
1982); Matter of Holland, 21 Bankr. 681 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1982); In re Johnson, 18 Bankr. 755
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982); In re Young, 14 Bankr. 809 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1981).
5. The only circuit court that holds that stay violations are voidable is the Fifth. See Sikes v.
Global Marine, Inc., 881 F.2d 176 (5th Cir.1989); Picco v. Global Marine Drilling Co., 900 F.2d 846
(5th Cir. 1990). Other courts that have followed the voidable rule include: In re Still, 117 Bankr.
251 (Bankr. E.D. I ex. 1990); In re Sapp, 91 Bankr. 520 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1988); In re Clark, 79
Bankr. 723 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987); In re Oliver, 38 Bankr. 245 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984); In re Fuel
Oil Supply and Terminaling, Inc., 30 Bankr. 360 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1983). See also In re Brooks,
79 Bankr. 479 (9th Cir. 1987); In re Schwartz, 119 Bankr. 207 (9th Cir. (BAP) 1990), rev'd, 954
F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1992).
6. See Part V.A.
7. See, for example, Schwartz, 954 F.2d at 571; Williams, 124 Bankr. at 316-17. See generally
Part III.A.
8. See, for example, Fuel Oil Supply, 30 Bankr. at 362. See generally Part III.B.
9. For examples of the scope of the debate's presentation, see Schwartz, 954 F.2d at 571-74;
Williams, 124 Bankr. at 316-17.
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has been constrained by the terms of its own proponents. Neither side
has ever examined the incentives that the different rules create, nor the
effect that these incentives have upon information transfer between the
debtor and the creditor concerning the debtor's filing of a bankruptcy
petition. 10
This Note addresses that gap in the void-voidable debate. Part II
examines the broad scope and underlying protective purposes of the au-
tomatic stay and suggests that while the importance of the stay is sig-
nificant, its reach is not necessarily unlimited. Part III outlines the
different rationales that support the two conflicting rules. Part IV dis-
cusses the famous case of Hadley v. Baxendale and describes how the
economic analysis of Hadley leads to the derivation of the information-
forcing paradigm. Part V first argues that the current debate between
the two rules has become an intractable conflict resulting from different
approaches to Code interpretation. The section then concludes that,
based upon the information-forcing paradigm and the problem of moral
hazard, courts should hold that violations of the automatic stay are
voidable rather than void.
II. SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY
Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code defines the scope of the au-
tomatic stay by specifically listing various acts that the commencement
of a bankruptcy case stays.11 The stay is self-operating and takes effect
10. A select number of courts have alleged that the voidable rule places upon the debtor the
unfair financial and evidentiary burdens of persuading the court that it should set aside the viola-
tive action. See, for example, Schwartz, 954 F.2d at 571; Williams, 124 Bankr. at 316-17. This
analysis, however, relates only to the burdens created after a violation of the stay has occurred.
This Note focuses instead upon how the voidable rule, through the threat of these burdens, can
create a previolation incentive for the debtor to convey information concerning the filing of the
bankruptcy petition. The exclusively postviolation burden analysis of Schwartz and Williams does
not address this issue.
11. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988) provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under section 301, 302,
or 303 of this title . . . operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of-
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of process,
of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor that was or
could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this title, or to
recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this
title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a judgment
obtained before the commencement of the case under this title;
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or
to exercise control over property of the estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any lien to the
extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the commencement of the case under
this title;
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the moment a debtor files its bankruptcy petition.12 The protection that
the stay provides is, in most regards, extremely broad, 13 so broad that
even activities such as dumping garbage on a debtor's lawn may violate
the stay.'4 The stay protects the debtor from both secured and un-
secured creditors, 15 and from both formal and informal actions they
may bring against the debtor or the bankruptcy estate.
1 6
Nevertheless, the Bankruptcy Code also establishes several catego-
ries of exceptions to the automatic stay.'7 Congress has drawn these ex-
ceptions quite narrowly, however, and most courts strictly interpret
them in order to facilitate the extensive relief that the stay provides.' 8
One of the major purposes underlying the automatic stay is debtor
protection,' 9 a purpose the Code's drafters themselves articulated.2 0 By
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the
commencement of the case under this title;
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the
case under this title against any claim against the debtor; and
(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United States Tax
Court concerning the debtor.
12. See In re Elder, 12 Bankr. 491, 494 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1981); John Francis Murphy, The
Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy, 34 Cleve. St. L. Rev. 567, 567 (1986) (explaining that the mere
filing of the petition triggers the stay).
13. See In re Stringer, 847 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir. 1988) (footnote omitted) (stating that
"Congress clearly intended the automatic stay to be quite broad"). See generally Murphy, 34
Cleve. St. L. Rev. at 571 (cited in note 12). According to one group of legal commentators, creditors
generally summarize Section 362(a) as meaning that "[i]f something is worth doing, you can't do it
because it will be stayed." David G. Epstein, Jonathan M. Landers, and Steve H. Nickles, Debtors
and Creditors: Cases and Materials 757 (West, 1987).
14. See In re Reed, 11 Bankr. 258 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981).
15. See In re Holtkamp, 669 F.2d 505, 508 (7th Cir. 1982).
16. See In re Smith, 876 F.2d 524, 525-26 (6th Cir. 1989) (stating that the stay "extends to
virtually all formal and informal actions"); Ass'n of St. Croix Condo. Owners v. St. Croix Hotel
Corp., 682 F.2d 446, 448 (3d Cir. 1982).
17. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (1988) (listing specific exceptions to the automatic stay).
18. See, for example, Stringer, 847 F.2d at 552 (footnote omitted) (stating that the Section
362(b) exceptions "should be read narrowly to secure the broad grant of relief to the debtor"). See
also Epstein, Landers, and Nickles, Debtors and Creditors at 757 (cited in note 13).
19. Most legal commentators agree that debtor protection is a major goal of the stay. See, for
example, Benjamin Weintraub and Alan N. Resnick, Bankruptcy Law Manual § 1.0911] at 1-31
(Warren, Gorham & Lamorit, 1986); Murphy, 34 Cleve. St. L. Rev. at 567 (cited in note 12).
20. The legislative history of Section 362(a) declares that:
The automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by the bank-
ruptcy laws. It gives the debtor a breathing spell from his creditors. It stops all collection
efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions. It permits the debtor to attempt a repay-
ment or reorganization plan, or simply to be relieved of the financial pressures that drove him
into bankruptcy.
H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6296-97.
Courts following the void rule have frequently cited this passage from the legislative history of
Section 362 with approval. See, for example, In re Smith, 876 F.2d 524, 525 (6th Cir. 1989); In re
Albany Partners, Ltd., 749 F.2d 670, 675 n.9 (11th Cir. 1984); In re Williams, 124 Bankr. 311, 316
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991).
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prohibiting creditor action, the stay gives debtors a breathing spell from
financial pressure,2' which in turn affords them an opportunity to
"regain their financial footing. 22 For corporate debtors, this means
time to regroup, restructure their affairs, and create a plan of reorgani-
zation to submit to the court.23 For the individual debtor, breathing
room from creditor pressure facilitates the chance for a fresh start.
24
A second purpose of the automatic stay is creditor protection. 5
The stay prevents creditors from racing to the courthouse steps in an
uncontrolled scramble for the debtor's assets.26 Such a race would not
only quickly deplete the bankruptcy estate,27 but also would defeat the
important bankruptcy goal of treating all creditors equitably.28 The
stay is the statutory barrier that prevents individual creditors from act-
ing in their own self-interest to the detriment of other creditors.2 9 With
this race stalled, the bankruptcy court is able to harmonize the interests
of all creditors involved.30
Given the protective functions that the automatic stay serves for
both the debtor and the creditor, the scope and importance of the stay
21. See Williams, 127 Bankr. at 316. See generally In re American Mariner Indus., 734 F.2d
426, 431 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating that the overriding purpose of the stay is to provide the debtor
with a "breathing spell").
22. Schwartz, 954 F.2d at 571.
23. See Matter of Baldwin-United Corp., 48 Bankr. 901, 902 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985) (ex-
plaining that Chapter 11 debtors must have "breathing room" in order to reorganize, and that the
stay's importance increases exponentially with the magnitude of the case). See generally Epstein,
Landers, and Nickles, Debtors and Creditors at 754 (cited in note 13).
24. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (stating that "[o]ne of the primary
purposes of the bankruptcy act is to 'relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive in-
debtedness and permit him to start afresh free from the obligations and responsibilities conse-
quent upon business misfortunes' ").
25. See H.R. Rep. No. 595, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6297 (cited in note 20) (stating
that "[t]he automatic stay also provides creditor protection, and that "[w]ithout it, certain credi-
tors would be able to pursue their own remedies against the debtor's property. . . in preference to
and to the detriment of other creditors").
26. See id.; American Mariner Industries, 734 F.2d at 431 (explaining that one of the stay's
purposes is protecting creditors from injuring each other in a race of diligence).
27. See Martin-Trigona v. Champion Fed. Say. & Loan Assn., 892 F.2d 575, 577 (7th Cir.
1989) (citation omitted) (arguing that the stay "protect[s] the bankrupt's estate from being eaten
away by creditors' lawsuits and seizures of property"). See also Murphy, 34 Cleve. St. L. Rev. at
568 (cited in note 12).
28. See Hunt v. Bankers Trust Co., 799 F.2d 1060, 1069 (5th Cir. 1986) (footnote omitted)
(stating that "[t]he purpose of the automatic stay is to protect creditors in a manner consistent
with the bankruptcy goal of equal treatment"); Weintraub and Resnick, Bankruptcy Law Manual
§ 1.09[1] at 1-31 (cited in note 19) (stating that the "orderly liquidation and fair and equal distri-
bution of the estate to creditors would be frustrated" by a race of diligence).
29. See Murray Tabb, Competing Policies in Bankruptcy: The Governmental Exception to
the Automatic Stay, 21 Tulsa L. J. 183, 184 (1985) (proposing that one of the stay's purposes is to
prevent creditors from having to enter a race of diligence).
30. See Fidelity Mortg. Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47, 55 (2d Cir. 1976).
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may appear all-encompassing."' There are, however, significant limita-
tions on the stay's application. For instance, only actions against the
debtor itself trigger the stay.32 The stay does not extend to protect
third parties or individuals who are jointly liable on debts with the
debtor.33 Furthermore, courts sometimes limit the debtor's ability to
manipulate the stay's application, as exemplified by the general judicial
prohibition against offensive uses of the stay.34
Despite these and other limitations on the stay, many courts view
the power and scope of the stay as virtually unlimited. 5 Some courts
even tend to wax poetic whenever the stay is invoked. For example,
courts have described the stay as the "protective armor" of the
debtor, 6 the "shield" that safeguards the bankrupt,1 and even as the
"ship upon which debtors embark on their fresh start."33 Such language
reveals the powerful assumption many courts make, the assumption
that the protective purposes of the stay are, in all circumstances, para-
mount. This assumption has in turn created what one commentator has
termed "a certain judicial gloss" with respect to the expansiveness of
Section 362(a).3 9 In other words, rather than analyzing stay violations
on a case-by-case basis, many courts react with the knee-jerk response
that the purposes of the stay override all else.4° As a result, these courts
often have overlooked facts that might require, or even demand the ap-
plication of a different rule.
31. Courts themselves often succumb to this view. See, for example, Matter of Dexter, 116
Bankr. 92, 95 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990) (stating that "[tihe automatic stay is integral to the bank-
ruptcy process and its importance cannot be overemphasized").
32. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (1988) (stating that only a "proceeding against the debtor"
triggers the stay); Freeman v. Commissioner, 799 F.2d 1091, 1092 (5th Cir. 1986).
33. Among the third parties and individuals that the stay does not protect are codefendants,
sureties and guarantors of the debtor. See Lynch v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 710 F.2d 1194,
1196-97 (6th Cir. 1983); Murphy, 34 Cleve. St. L. Rev. at 559 (cited in note 12); Epstein, Landers,
and Nickles, Debtors and Creditors at 745 (cited in note 13).
34. See generally Keating, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 71 (cited in note 3). For a list of courts holding
that offensive uses of the stay are not authorized, see id. at 72 n.6.
35. See, for example, the Lampkin, Grady, and Dexter decisions, cited previously in notes 2
and 31.
36. Williams, 124 Bankr. at 316.
37. See Keating, 45 Vand. L. Rev. at 72 nn.4-6.
38. Lampkin, 116 Bankr. at 453.
39. Murphy, 34 Cleve. St. L. Rev. at 568 (cited in note 12) (stating that "[t]he reputation of
the pervasiveness of § 362(a) among legal practitioners and members of the bench has done much
to add a certain judicial gloss to the expansiveness afforded that provision in some of the cases
under which it is construed").
40. Not all courts, however, yield to this view. See, for example, Price & Pierce Int'l, Inc. v.
Spicers Int'l Paper Sales, Inc., 50 Bankr. 25, 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (citation omitted) (explaining
that "[a]lthough the scope of the automatic stay 'is undeniably broad', . . : it does not operate to




These observations are not meant to deny the broad purpose and
scope of the automatic stay. Rather, they are made to suggest that
when courts address stay violations, they should not immediately dis-
miss the concepts of incentive and cost as being antithetical to the pro-
tective purposes of the stay. Commentators have already recognized the
role that such concepts play with respect to discharge. 41 Application of
cost and incentive analysis to the operation of the automatic stay seems
to be a logical extension, particularly if the costs are low and the bene-
fits are substantial. Thus, when examining the void-voidable debate,
the mere mention of the protective purposes of the automatic stay does
not and should not foreclose all other modes of analysis. Rather, the
protective purposes of the stay are merely the prologue to the
discussion.
III. PARAMETERS OF THE VOID-VOIDABLE DEBATE
A. Actions Taken in Violation of the Stay as Void
One of the most important decisions to hold that actions in viola-
tion of the bankruptcy stay are null and void is Kalb v. Feuerstein.2 In
Kalb, a mortgagee foreclosed upon a family farm. The county court
confirmed the subsequent sheriff's sale, even though the debtor had a
petition pending under the Bankruptcy Act at the time of the confirma-
tion.4 After being evicted from their property, the debtors brought an
action in equity.44 The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the Bank-
ruptcy Act did not operate as an automatic statutory stay triggered by
filing, and that, absent a formal judicial stay, the confirmation of sale
did not violate the Act.
45
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. 46 Relying heavily upon legisla-
tive history and congressional intent,47 the Court found that Congress
had created a "general plan" for relieving debtors from the necessity
41. See, for example, Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98
Harv. L. Rev. 1393, 1427 (1985) (arguing that the question of whether "exercise of the right of
discharge should come at some cost, however, is not-or at least should not be-an open ques-
tion"). For an excellent discussion of costs associated with discharge, as well as the effect of per-
verse incentives, see Keating, 45 Vand. L. Rev. at 125-28 (cited in note 3).
42. 308 U.S. 433 (1940).
43. See id. at 435-36. The Bankruptcy Act in force in 1940 was the Frazier-Lemke Act, 11
U.S.C. § 203 (superseded by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978).
44. The action, brought in the Circuit Court of Walworth County, Wisconsin against the
mortgagees who had purchased the farm, sought restoration of possession, cancellation of the sale,
and removal of the mortgagees. The circuit court dismissed the case for failure to state a cause of
action, and the debtors appealed. See Kalb, 308 U.S. at 436.
45. See id. at 437.
46. See id. at 444.
47. See id. at 441-42.
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and expense of litigation. In accordance with this plan, the Bankruptcy
Act conveyed exclusive jurisdiction over the debtor and his property to
the bankruptcy court.48 As a result, the Supreme Court held that the
confirmation of sale, made in violation of the stay, was issued "without
authority of law," '49 and was therefore void.
°
Although Kalb was decided almost forty years before Congress
adopted the current Bankruptcy Reform Act, most of the courts that
follow the void rule cite Kalb as precedent.51 Though the factual situa-
tions before these courts have varied greatly,52 they have all concluded
that actions taken in violation of the automatic stay are void ab initio
and, therefore, without legal effect.53 This holding generally extends
even to situations in which a creditor has not received notice of the
bankruptcy filing and therefore lacks knowledge of the stay.54
Courts most often justify the void rule by emphasizing the primary
importance of the automatic stay.55 Courts adopting the void rule typi-
cally employ the following reasoning. First, they find that the protective
purposes of the automatic stay are central to the goals of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. Second, they reason that the void rule provides debtors
with strong protection from creditors, and also encourages respect for
48. Id. at 443. See also id. at 442 (citing House Rep. No. 1808, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.) (stating
that "it was the intention of Congress . . .that the farmer-debtor and all of his property should
come under the jurisdiction of the court of bankruptcy").
49. Id. at 443.
50. See id. at 438 (stating that the county court's action "was not merely erroneous but was
beyond its power, void, and subject to collateral attack").
51. See, for example, Stringer, 847 F.2d at 551; In re Ward, 837 F.2d 124, 126 (3d Cir. 1988);
Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp., 685 F.2d at 1308. In contrast, the courts that hold stay violations
voidable do not consider Kalb binding precedent. See notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
52. See, for example, In re Eisenberg, 7 Bankr. 683, 686 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding a
postpetition tax lien sale void); In re Miller, 10 Bankr. 778, 780 (Bankr. D. Md. 1981) (holding a
postpetition car repossession void); In re Advent Corp., 24 Bankr. 612, 614 (1st Cir. 1982) (holding
an insurer's postpetition bond cancellation "of no effect"); In re Grosse, 68 Bankr. 847, 850
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (holding a postpetition garnishment of debtor's bank account void); In re
Ellis, 66 Bankr. 821, 823 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (holding the Department's commencement of a civil ac-
tion against the debtor void).
53. See notes 4 and 52.
54. See, for example, In re Young, 14 Bankr. 809, 811 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1981) (citations omit-
ted) (stating that "[t]he stay created by §362(a) is an automatic statutory stay and acts taken in
violation of the stay are void ab initio regardless of notice"); Advent Corp., 24 Bankr. at 614
(citations omitted) (stating that actions "done in violation of the stay are void ab initio regardless
of lack of knowledge of the filing of the petition"). See also In re Smith, 876 F.2d 524, 526 (6th Cir.
1989); Miller, 10 Bankr. at 780.
55. See, for example, In re Garcia, 109 Bankr. 335, 340 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (holding that "the
fundamental importance of the automatic stay to the purposes sought to be accomplished by the
Bankruptcy Code requires that acts in violation of the automatic stay be void, rather than
voidable").
56. See generally notes 19-30 and accompanying text.
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the stay while discouraging its violation. Finally, in order to support
the Code's overriding goal of debtor protection, these courts adopt the
void rule. 8
Even under this view, however, the void rule is not absolute. Both
the caselaw and the Bankruptcy Code itself provide exceptions to the
rule. The most obvious of these is Section 549(c) of the Code, which
provides protection to a good faith postpetition purchaser of real prop-
erty. 9 In a similar vein, Section 542(c) protects an entity who, with no
knowledge of the bankruptcy filing, transfers property of the estate
without proper permission."
Within the caselaw, the courts have developed two limited excep-
tions. First, the stealthily silent debtor exception holds that a debtor
may not abuse the automatic stay by remaining stealthily silent and
allowing a creditor to unknowingly violate the stay.6 1 The second excep-
tion applies to technical violations of the stay. This exception suggests
that, in limited circumstances, a mere technical stay violation, such as
the postpetition correction of a mistake in a deed, will not necessarily
render the action void.2 Courts have not yet clearly defined or widely
applied this exception, however, and its scope, therefore, is difficult to
determine.6 Regardless, the exact parameters of these exceptions are
not overly important. Rather, what is important is the recognition that
even courts which hold stay violations void ab initio nevertheless ac-
knowledge the necessity for exceptions to the rule.
57. See, for example, Schwartz, 954 F.2d at 571 (stating that "[i]f violations are void ...
debtors are afforded better protection and can focus their attention on reorganization"); Maritime
Elec. Co., Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 959 F.2d 1194, 1207 (3d Cir. 1991) (stating that "by treating
judicial acts and proceedings in violation of the stay as void acts, we deter non-bankruptcy courts
from continuing proceedings against a debtor who has sought federal bankruptcy protection").
58. See note 55.
59. See 11 U.S.C. § 549(c) (1988). Courts and commentators that follow the void rule tend to
view parts of the Code such as § 549(c) as limited statutory exceptions to the void rule, and not as
indicative of the general voidability of stay violations. See, for example, Murphy, 34 Cleve. St. L.
Rev. at 592 (cited in note 12) (discussing §§ 549(c)-(d) as discrete statutory exceptions to the Kalb
rule); In re Wingo, 89 Bankr. 54, 57 (9th Cir. 1988). In contrast, courts following the voidable rule
interpret such sections within a broader context. See notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
60. See 11 U.S.C. § 542(c) (1988).
61. This exception was first enunciated in In re Smith Corset Shops, Inc., 696 F.2d 971, 976-
77 (Ist Cir. 1982). Courts generally enforce the exception under traditional equitable doctrines of
laches and estoppel. See Williams, 124 Bankr. at 316-17.
62. See In re Brooks, 124 Bankr. 311, 316-17 (9th Cir. 1987); Wingo, 89 Bankr. at 57.
63. See Schwartz, 954 F.2d at 574-75 (refraining from addressing the validity of the technical
violation exception).
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B. Actions Taken in Violation of the Stay as Voidable
The courts that hold violations of the automatic stay to be voidable
rather than void are members of a definite minority.6 4 This minority is,
however, significant and vocal.6 5 The rationales supporting the decision
of these courts to adopt the voidable rule can be broken down into
three general categories.
First, the courts following the voidable rule pay close attention to
the legal definitions of the terms "void" and "voidable." Defined liter-
ally, the term void implies an absolute nullity. A void act, therefore, is
utterly incapable of cure.6 6 In contrast, the term voidable merely sug-
gests a defective transaction which ultimately may be either declared
void and invalid, or cured by ratification." These courts then argue that
the various statutory and common-law exceptions to the void rule 8 are
inconsistent with the definition of a void act as an absolute nullity.6 9
Legal accuracy, therefore, requires that courts deem stay violations
voidable. °
Second, these courts look to Section 362(d), which empowers bank-
ruptcy courts to grant relief from the stay "by terminating, annulling,
modifying, or conditioning" the stay.71 Whereas termination of the stay
results only in a present negation, annulment of the stay means that
the court has the ability to fashion relief with retroactive effect.7 2 The
64. See note 5 and accompanying text.
65. See Williams, 124 Bankr. at 316 (referring to the sharp split among the jurisdictions on
this issue, with "a significant minority" following the voidable rule).
66. See In re Oliver, 38 Bankr. 245, 247 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984) (stating that "[b]y strict,
literal definition, a void instrument or transaction is one which is wholly ineffective, inoperative,
and incapable of ratification," and thus, "[a] void act would . . . have no force or effect 'so that
nothing could cure it' ") (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1411 (West, 5th ed. 1979)).
67. See id. at 247 (explaining that "[t]he word voidable. . . describes a defective transaction
or act that may be declared void, yet may be cured by confirmation or ratification"); Schwartz, 119
Bankr. at 209.
68. See notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
69. See Schwartz, 119 Bankr. at 209 (citation omitted) (explaining that "[t]he application of
such limitations to allow 'void' acts to become effective [such as § 549(c) and various equitable
exceptions] is inconsistent with the definition of the term and reflects the imprecision often in-
volved in the use of these terms").
70. See, for example, Sikes v. Global Marine, Inc., 881 F.2d 176, 178 (5th Cir. 1989) (cita-
tions omitted) (stating "that when technical accuracy is desired, the term 'void' can only be prop-
erly applied to those [transactions] that are of no effect whatsoever, mere nullities. . . . and
therefore incapable of confirmation or ratification"). See also Schwartz, 119 Bankr. at 209.
71. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1988).
72. For example, as the court in Sikes explained:
The difference between the two [annulling and terminating] is that an order annulling
the stay could operate retroactively to the date of the filing of the petition which gave rise to
the stay, and thus validate actions taken by the party at a time when he may have been
unaware of the existence of the stay. On the other hand, an order terminating the stay would
be operative only from the date of its entry.
1672
1992] VOIDABILITY OF ACTIONS 1673
annulment power is thus inconsistent with a rule that declares all stay
violations incurable. 73 As a result, these courts read Section 362(d) as
clear congressional intent that courts deem stay violations voidable, not
void.
7 4
Similarly, the proponents of the voidable rule interpret Sections
542(c) and 549(c) of the Code7 5 not as exceptions to the void rule, but
rather as further indication that Congress intended stay violations to be
voidable.7 Furthermore, some courts have stressed the discretionary
nature of the trustee's power to avoid postpetition transfers under Sec-
tion 549. If all postpetition transfers in violation of the stay were abso-
lutely void, these courts argue, then Section 549 would serve no
purpose.77 Therefore, since Section 549 is inconsistent with the void
rule, courts must deem violations of the stay voidable.
Finally, the voidable rule proponents criticize the void rule as being
unnecessarily broad and unyielding.7 8 In contrast, the voidable rule pro-
vides courts the flexibility necessary to accommodate circumstances
that the exceptions specified in the Code do not cover." Therefore, the
voidable rule provides a more equitable alternative to the harsh results
that the void rule often creates.s0 Although the voidable rule may ham-
per the protective purposes of the stay, at least one court has argued
that such a result can be overcome by application of Section 362(h),
Sikes, 881 F.2d at 179 (quoting 2 Collier's Bankruptcy Manual § 362.06 (Matthew Bender, 3d ed.
1983)). See also Murphy, 34 Cleve. St. L. Rev. at 597 (cited in note 12) (stating that "only annul-
ment reaches back in time to reverse the prior effect of the stay," while "[a] 'termination' or 'modi-
fication' is effective only upon entry on the docket of the order granting such relief").
73. See Oliver, 38 Bankr. at 248 (stating that "[i]n light of this power to validate [retroac-
tively], violations of the stay are voidable rather than void because a void act could not be ratified
or cured") (citation omitted).
74. See Brooks, 79 Bankr. at 482 (explaining that "acts taken in violation of the stay are not
void but voidable," because "[o]therwise, there would be nothing to modify or condition").
75. See notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
76. See, for example, Brooks, 79 Bankr. at 482.
77. See, for example, Sikes, 881 F.2d at 179; Oliver, 38 Bankr. at 248; Clark, 79 Bankr. at
725.
78. See, for example, In re Fuel Oil Supply and Terminaling, Inc., 30 Bankr. 360, 362
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1983) (stating that "the characterization of every violation of § 362 as being
absolutely void is inaccurate and overly broad"); Oliver, 38 Bankr. at 248; Sikes, 881 F.2d at 178.
Courts do not, however, utilize this argument as frequently as the other arguments already
discussed.
79. See Weintraub and Resnick, Bankruptcy Law Manual § 1.09[10] at 1-50 n.100 (cited in
note 19) (referring to the voidable rule as a more flexible view).
80. See, for example, Clark, 79 Bankr. at 725 (stating that although a lack of notice "doesn't
affect the existence of the stay; as a practical matter, it impacts upon the equities of the situa-
tion"); Oliver, 38 Bankr. at 248-49 (finding the application of the void rule inappropriate when the
debtor failed to give notice for almost seven months after filing).
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which provides a cause of action for debtors injured by willful stay
violations."'
It should also be noted that the courts following the voidable rule
do not regard the Supreme Court's decision in Kalb v. Feuerstein2 as
binding."3 The courts adopt this view because the Supreme Court de-
cided Kalb prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978, and
consequently before the annulment power of bankruptcy courts had
even been conceived.8 4 Because Kalb was decided within a statutory
context that no longer exists, it does not prohibit courts from adopting
the voidable rule.
IV. DELINEATION OF THE INFORMATION-FORCING PARADIGM
A. Hadley v. Baxendale
In the famous case of Hadley v. Baxendale,85 the plaintiffs oper-
ated a mill in Gloucester. The plaintiffs hired the defendants, a com-
mon-carrier firm, to transport a broken crank shaft to the original
manufacturer in Greenwich. The shaft was to serve as a pattern for the
replacement part. The plaintiffs, apparently having no spare shafts, had
to close the mill down until the new shaft arrived. The defendants,
however, failed to deliver the new shaft within the promised time, thus
forcing the plaintiffs to close the mill for several days longer than they
had previously expected. As a result, plaintiffs lost profits they would
otherwise have received had the defendants delivered the shaft on time.
Plaintiffs brought an action for recovery of these lost profits.8
The court reasoned that, in the vast majority of cases, the cessation
of mill operation would not result from a delay in the delivery of a
crankshaft. The court then held that since plaintiffs never communi-
cated the unique circumstances and risks involved, lost profits were not
an appropriate measure of damages. 7 If the carrier had known of the
81. See Schwartz, 119 Bankr. at 211. The Bankruptcy Code provides that "[a]n individual
injured by any willful violation of a stay provided by this section shall recover actual damages,
including costs and attorneys' fees, and, in appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive dam-
ages." 11 U.S.C. § 362(h).
82. 308 U.S. 433 (1940).
83. See, for example, Sikes, 881 F.2d at 179 n.2.
84. See id. (stating that "[w]hen the Supreme Court decided Kalb in 1940, bankruptcy refer-
ees had the express statutory power only to modify or terminate the automatic stay. The power to
annul the stay had not been authorized. .. That scenario no longer applies"). See also Schwartz,
119 Bankr. at 210.
85. 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
86. This discussion of the facts of Hadley is drawn from Hadley v. Baxendale as reprinted in
Friedrich Kessler, Grant Gilmore, and Anthony T. Kronman, Contracts: Cases and Materials 106-
109 (Little, Brown, 3d ed. 1986), with reference to Judge Posner's discussion of Hadley in Rardin
v. T. & D. Machine Handling, Inc., 890 F.2d 24, 26-27 (7th Cir. 1989).
87. See Hadley v. Baxendale, reprinted in Kessler, Gilmore, and Kronman, Contracts at 108
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special circumstances in this case, it might have taken extra precautions
to assure timely delivery, such as making a special trip solely to trans-
port the shaft. Since the defendants were never fully appraised of the
circumstances involved, however, they did not know special precautions
were necessary. The court, therefore, denied the plaintiffs' request for
recovery of lost profits.
From Hadley, the general rule has developed that courts should
disallow consequential damages unless the plaintiff clearly and fully in-
forms the defendant of the special circumstances that might produce
such damages.8 Courts often state this rule in terms of foreseeability,
declaring that only damages which are reasonably foreseeable are recov-
erable in an action for breach of contract.89 Regardless of the principle's
exact formulation, however, the Hadley rule is firmly entrenched within
contract law.90
B. Economic Understanding of Hadley
The use of terminology such as "foreseeability" and "special cir-
cumstances" is not the only way to understand and justify the Hadley
rule. Rather, the limitation upon recovery of consequential damages in
breach of contract cases may also be understood as an issue of efficient
incentive creation through the application of a penalty default rule.91
In general, default rules are contractual gapfillers. These rules
serve as implicit terms of a contract unless specifically contracted
around.9 2 Penalty default rules are an extension of this basic concept.9
Penalty defaults are intentionally set by the courts in order to penalize
parties to a contract. The possibility of a judicially imposed penalty cre-
ates a strong incentive for parties to opt out of the default rule by ex-
(stating that "in the great multitude of cases of millers sending off broken shafts to third persons
by a carrier under ordinary circumstances, such consequences [cessation of mill operation resulting
in lost profits] would not, in all probability, have occurred; and these special circumstances were
here never communicated by plaintiffs to the defenc ants").
88. See EVRA Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951, 955-56 (7th Cir. 1982).
89. See, for example, Marvin A. Chirelstein, Concepts and Case Analysis in the Law of Con-
tracts 151 (Foundation, 1990) (defining the Hadley rule as being that "damages are not recover-
able for loss that was not reasonably foreseeable by the party in breach at the time of
contracting"). Judge Posner, however, criticizes this conceptualization of the rule as being "mad-
deningly vague." Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 115 (Little, Brown and Co., 3d
ed. 1986).
90. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 351 (1981). See also Arthur Linton Corbin,
Corbin on Contracts § 1007 at 70-73 (West, 1964); Samuel Williston, Treatise on the Law of Con-
tracts § 1357 at 292-98 (Baker, Voorhis & Co., 3d ed. 1968).
91. See, for example, Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 114 (cited in note 89) (discussing
incentive allocation explicitly and penalty defaults implicitly).
92. See Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L. J. 87 (1989).
93. The term "penalty default" was first used by Ayres and Gertner. See id. at 91.
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plicitly providing an alternative contractual term."4 As a result, penalty
default rules encourage discussion between the parties and facilitate the
efficient transfer of important information. 5
The Hadley rule is such a penalty default.9 6 Though the miller in
Hadley suffered substantial consequential damages, the court did not
allow him to obtain redress from the carrier. Rather, the court penal-
ized the miller for not revealing the specialized information that he pos-
sessed, specifically, the possibility of substantial lost profits from a
delay in delivery.9 7 The Hadley decision creates a significant incentive
not only for future millers, but also future contractual parties, to reveal
information concerning the possibility of unusually large consequential
losses.9" This penalty default rule, therefore, encourages contractual
parties to transfer information in order to opt-out of the default rule.
Furthermore, as a result of the increased information flow, one of the
parties will eventually take adequate precautions against the risk of
loss. 9 Therefore, the final result of the Hadley rule is to place the risk
of loss upon the shoulders of the party best able to bear such loss: the
least-cost avoider.
The general conclusions of this information transfer analysis con-
stitute the information-forcing paradigm. 10 0 The underlying concept of
this model, that the limitation upon unforeseeable consequential dam-
ages encourages efficient information revelation and transfer, is the "es-
tablished economic understanding" of the Hadley rule.10
94. See id.
95. See id. (stating that "penalty defaults are purposefully set at what the parties would not
want-in order to encourage the parties to reveal information to each other or to third parties
(especially the courts)").
96. See id. at 101 (explaining that "[tihe holding in Hadley operates as a penalty default");
Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules,
100 Yale L. J. 615, 616 (1990).
97. See Johnston, 100 Yale L. J. at 616 (explaining that the Hadley "rule penalizes a prom-
isee who will suffer high consequential loss . . . by denying her recovery of much of her loss").
98. See Ayres and Gertner, 99 Yale L. J. at 101 (cited in note 92) (positing that the Hadley
rule is "a purposeful inducement to the miller as the more informed party to reveal that informa-
tion to the carrier").
99. See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 114 (cited in note 89) (stating that Hadley
"induces the party with knowledge of the risk either to take appropriate precautions himself or, if
he believes that the other party might be the more efficient preventor or spreader (insurer) of the
loss, to reveal the risk to that party and pay him to assume it").
100. Although information incentives have been discussed in connection with Hadley for
years, the specific term "information-forcing paradigm" was first used by Johnston. See Johnston,
100 Yale L. J. at 621 (cited in note 96).
101. Id. For examples of this theoretical acceptance, see William Bishop, The Contract-Tort
Boundary and the Economics of Insurance, 12 J. Legal Stud. 241, 254 (1983) (stating that Hadley
"concerns . . . the efficient transfer of information"); Lucian Ayre Bebchuk and Steven Shavell,
Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The Rule of Hadley v. Baxendale,
7 J. L. Econ. & Organ. 284, 285-86 (1991); Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 114 (cited in note
[Vol. 45:16631676
1992] VOIDABILITY OF ACTIONS 1677
V. JUSTIFICATION OF THE VOIDABLE RULE
A. The Void-Voidable Debate and Conflicting Models of Statutory
Interpretation
The void rule proponents generally base their conclusions upon
policy considerations. 1 2 In their view, because the protective purposes
of the automatic stay are fundamental to the goals of the Bankruptcy
Code, courts must hold violations of the stay null and void. 10 The void
rule, therefore, stems from a purposivist theory of statutory interpreta-
tion. The purposivist theory contends that unless statutory language
clearly resolves an interpretive issue, courts should adopt the interpre-
tation that best advances the statute's purpose. 04 A court that adheres
to the purposivist theory, therefore, will generally support the void rule.
In contrast, the voidable rule represents a textualist approach to
Code interpretation. 0 5 Textualism strives for horizontal coherence'06 by
maintaining interpretive consistency and continuity throughout the
statute's text, the entire statutory scheme, and any analogous stat-
89). In partial opposition to this general acceptance, see Johnston, 100 Yale L. J. at 615 (cited in
note 96) (discussing how strategic incentives in the bargaining context can at times conflict with
informaiton relevation principles).
102. See, for example, Schwartz, 954 F.2d at 571 (stating that "[iln light of the automatic
stay's purpose, the [void-voidable] issue. . . requires some analysis of the relevant policy consider-
ations") (footnote omitted).
103. See notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
104. Purposivism is based on the premise that since every statute was created with some
purpose in mind, "identifying that purpose and deducing the interpretation with which it is most
consistent resolves interpretive ambiguities." William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, Stat-
utory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 321, 333 (1990). Some scholars be-
lieve that purposivism has become the "traditional" theory of statutory interpretation. See, for
example, Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Inter-
pretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 223, 250-51 (1986).
105. The term "textualism" as used here refers to the "new textualism" discussed in William
N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 621 (1990). Traditional textualism
argues that "under ordinary principles of grammar and dictionary definitions of its words, the
statutory provision has only one meaning." Id. at 660. See also Eskridge and Frickey, 42 Stan. L.
Rev. at 340 (describing strict textualism). New textualism expands upon this definition, and ex-
plicitly includes consideration of the statute's structure in determining the text's meaning. Es-
kridge, 37 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 621. Justice Scalia employs this interpretive scheme. See, for
example, United Savings Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Ass'n, 484 U.S. 365, 371
(1988) (explaining that "[sitatutory construction. . . is a holistic endeavor. A provision that may
seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme-because
the same terminology is used elsewhere in a context that makes its meaning clear"). See generally
Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism: The "New" New Legal Process, 12 Cardozo L.
Rev. 1597 (1991).
106. See Zeppos, 12 Cardozo L. Rev. at 1621 (stating that "textualism. . .strives for overall
coherence in the law by borrowing from other provisions of the United States Code"); Eskridge, 37
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 678 (pointing out that Scalia's textualism "emphasizes horizontal coherence in
statutory interpretation").
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utes. °7 If one interpretation of a statute contradicts or renders inopera-
tive another part of the statute, textualism rejects that
interpretation. 108 Therefore, when proponents of the voidable rule argue
that the void rule renders the annulment power of Section 362(d)
meaningless, 0 9 or that Sections 542 and 549 reveal implicit congres-
sional approval of the voidable rule," 0 they are arguing for horizontal
coherence"' within a textualist framework."
12
The void rule proponents have made several responses to these
horizontal coherence arguments. First, with regard to Section 362(d),
they contend that when a court grants retroactive relief to a creditor,
this negates the existence of the stay violation. The void-voidable ques-
tion, therefore, is no longer an issue." 3 Under this interpretation, the
void rule represents the normal operation of the stay, and the annul-
ment power of Section 362(d) is nothing more than a specific statutory
exception to that operation.
1 4
107. Legal scholars have defined horizontal coherence as a demonstration of continuity be-
tween the interpretation and "legal sources existing at the time of the interpretive event-namely,
the current version of the statutory text, the whole statute in which it is found, analogous statu-
tory texts and their current judicial interpretations, and the canons of statutory construction."
Eskridge, 37 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 678 (cited in note 105). This is opposed to vertical coherence,
which addresses continuity between the interpretation and sources preceding the interpretation,
such as legislative history. See id.
108. See id. at 661 (noting that textualists closely examine whether one interpretation of a
statute renders another provision meaningless).
109. See notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
110. See notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
111. The argument made by these courts concerning the correct definition of void and voida-
ble may also be viewed as a demand for horizontal coherence. Rather than relating to horizontal
coherence within the interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code, however, this argument addresses
horizontal coherence and accuracy within the caselaw surrounding the void-voidable distinction
generally.
112. It is interesting to note that the arguments based upon flexibility and equity made by
some of the courts supporting the voidable rule are not what one might normally expect of a strict
textualist. See notes 78-80 and accompanying text. One can either contend that the flexibility and
equity provided by the voidable rule are merely beneficial consequences of application of a textual-
ist approach in this situation, or that these courts are applying textualist arguments for the sole
purpose of achieving what they view as the equitable result. This is a recurring problem in textual-
ist interpretation. In accord, Eskridge and Frickey, 42 Stan. L. Rev. at 343 (cited in note 104)
(arguing that "current values cannot easily be excluded from statutory interpretation"). The first
contention appears to be more probable, however, given that not all courts following the voidable
rule invoke the equity argument, and those that do fail to place primary importance upon it. See,
for example, Sikes, 881 F.2d at 178 (discussing the argument in a single sentence). Therefore, the
existence of this argument does not deny that the proponents of the voidable rule generally adopt
a textualist approach.
113. See, for example, Schwartz, 954 F.2d at 573. In fact, this argument only seems to beg
the question. If a void act is an absolute nullity, then retroactive negation under Section 362(d) is
redundant and therefore unnecessary. Thus, the question is not rendered moot, but merely
sidestepped.
114. See, for example, id.
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Second, with regard to Section 549, courts following the void rule
argue that this section generally applies to transfers which the debtor
willingly makes.115 Since the automatic stay does not specifically pre-
vent debtors from willingly transferring property postpetition, the void
rule does not render Section 549 duplicative. " 6 Rather, it clarifies the
role of Section 549.
Despite these specific responses to the arguments supporting the
voidable rule, the void rule proponents almost always fall back upon the
underlying protective purposes of the automatic stay." 7 Thus, while the
void courts may sometimes engage the voidable courts in limited debate
upon textualist ground, they ultimately retreat to a purposivist defen-
sive posture. The result is, in many ways, a lively debate between two
parties speaking different languages, with the outcome determined by
which language one finds preferable. For a purposivist court, the pur-
pose of the stay prevails, and violations of the stay must be void. For a
textualist court, the need for horizontal coherence and interpretive ac-
curacy prevails, and violations of the stay must be voidable.
Because a court's method of statutory interpretation generally dic-
tates its resolution of the void-voidable issue, a choice between these
two interpretive strategies seems required.' 1 8 An alternative path of rea-
soning, however, which the courts have not yet fully considered, also
exists. This path approaches statutory interpretation in terms of inter-
pretive compromise and practical reason, not intractable adherence to
purposivism or textualism.1" Application of such a result-oriented ap-
proach to the void-voidable debate is particularly appropriate, given the
specific circumstances involved. It is possible to demonstrate that the
voidable rule, by penalizing inactive and silent debtors, encourages
debtors to inform creditors when they file their bankruptcy petitions.'
20
Because this transfer of information is of low cost to the debtor, the
protective purposes of the stay are only minimally affected, and hori-
115. See Garcia, 109 Bankr. at 339.
116. See id.; Schwartz, 954 F.2d at 573-74.
117. See, for example, Garcia, 109 Bankr. at 340:
[T]o the extent any inconsistency may exist between an interpretation of § 362(a) as
making actions in violation of the automatic stay void and § 549, the court concludes that the
fundamental importance of the automatic stay to the purposes sought to be accomplished by
the Bankruptcy Code requires that acts in violation of the automatic stay be void, rather than
voidable.
118. This choice is not as easy as it might appear. Purposivism and textualism both have
their difficulties, and some commentators have even suggested that the use of foundationalism in
statutory interpretation is itself a flawed approach. See generally Eskridge and Frickey, 42 Stan. L.
Rev. at 321 (cited in note 104).
119. See id.
120. See Part V.B.1.
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zontal coherence is maintained.121 Overcoming the barrier between in-
terpretive modes may thus be possible simply by developing a different
perspective on the problem. That perspective is the information-forcing
paradigm.
B. Application of the Information-Forcing Paradigm
1. Penalty Aspects of Voidability
Application of the penalty default and information-forcing analysis
derived from Hadley v. Baxendale is not limited to the arena of con-
tractual damage rules. 122 In fact, some legal commentators have already
suggested that the same type of default rule analysis should apply to
the debtor-creditor relationship. 2 3 In general, under the information-
forcing paradigm, a penalty default is appropriate when:
1. Party A possesses information unknown to Party B.
2. Party B might alter its behavior to make breach or violation less
likely if it knows the information.
3. The cost to Party A of transferring the information is low.
4. Party A fails to transfer such information.'24
When these four standards are met, the value of the information in
question to Party B is greater than the cost to Party A of transferring
the information. The efficient transfer of this information, therefore,
should be encouraged.
25
By applying these standards to the circumstances surrounding stay
violations, application of penalty default rule analysis can be justified.
With regards to the first standard, debtors usually have the best infor-
mation regarding their own financial troubles. Debtors are aware they
may file a bankruptcy petition long before most of their creditors. Fur-
121. See id.
122. See Ayres and Gertner, 99 Yale L. J. at 129 (cited in note 92) (explaining that such
analysis is "quite general and can be applied to a wide range of legal issues"). For example, this
form of analysis has been applied within the context of statutory interpretation, see id., and tort,
see EVRA Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951 (7th Cir. 1982).
123. In accord, see Douglas G. Baird and Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law
and Its Proper Domain, 38 Vand. L. Rev. 829, 835-36 (1985) (stating that "[tihe ambition of the
law governing the debtor-creditor relationship, including fraudulent conveyance law, should pro-
vide all the parties with the type of contract that they would have agreed to if they had had the
time and money to bargain over all aspects of their deal").
124. These standards are based upon those set forth by Bishop, 12 J. Legal Stud. at 254-55
(cited in note 101), who in turn credits John H. Barton's The Economic Basis of Damages for
Breach of Contract, 1 J. Legal Stud. 277 (1972), and Richard A. Posner's Economic Analysis of
Law 94-95 (Little, Brown, 2d ed. 1977) for providing the essence of his guidelines. The guidelines
presented by Bishop deal only with Hadley's denial of recovery of consequential damages, and not
with penalty defaults in general. Given the broad applicability of the Hadley penalty default anal-
ysis, however, the extrapolation seems appropriate. See note 122.
125. See Bishop, 12 J. Legal Stud. at 255 (cited in note 101).
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thermore, because the vast majority of bankruptcy petitions are filed
voluntarily, 2 ' most debtors have precise and immediate information re-
garding the commencement of their bankruptcy case. A creditor, how-
ever, will not receive the equivalent information officially for several
weeks or more.127 Therefore, if a debtor chooses not to give notice of
filing, the only way a creditor can realistically obtain this information is
to check the bankruptcy case filings every day. Since such activity obvi-
ously involves prohibitive transaction costs, the creditor will in all
probability remain uninformed.
With regards to the second standard, most creditors with knowl-
edge of a bankruptcy petition filing would indeed alter their behavior to
avoid violating the stay. Often, stay violations are simply the honest
mistakes of creditors whom have not been notified of the commence-
ment of the bankruptcy case.1 21 Many of these creditors would not have
acted had they been aware of the bankruptcy filing. Furthermore, a
creditor with notice of the filing who nevertheless violates the stay is
subject to both a finding of contempt 129 and the penalties of Section
362(h).130 Once notice triggers those penalties, they serve as strong de-
126. See Epstein, Landers, and Nickles, Debtors and Creditors at 720 (cited in note 13) (esti-
mating that 99% of all bankruptcy petitions filed are voluntary).
127. While Section 342(b) does require the clerk of the court to send notice to all creditors
listed by the debtor, this notice "is usually not received until several weeks after the petition is
filed." Weintraub and Resnick, Bankruptcy Law Manual § 1.09[1] at 1-49 (cited in note 19). This
time lag, an inevitable result of bureaucracy, often results in serious problems for creditors. See,
for example, rote 137.
128. See, for example, In re Lampkin, 116 Bankr. at 451, 453 (Bankr. D. Md. 1990) (deciding
a case involving a creditor who received no notice prior to foreclosure; the court acknowledged that
some creditors are "innocent parties").
129. Section 362(a) effectively constitutes a court order with sufficient specificity for con-
tempt purposes. See Fidelity Mortgage Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47, 51 (2d
Cir. 1976); In re Mealey, 16 Bankr. 800 (E.D. Pa 1982). A finding of contempt can result in award-
ing of attorneys' fees and the imposition of fines. See Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp., 685 F.2d at
1309. A court may only find contempt, however, if the creditor had knowledge of the bankruptcy
case. See In re Zartun, 30 Bankr. 543, 546 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that knowledge of the petition's
filing without knowledge of the stay is sufficient for a finding of contempt); Fidelity Mortgage, 550
F.2d at 51; Miller, 10 Bankr. at 779-80. Thus, the transfer of information concerning filing by the
debtor to the creditor invokes the specter of contempt.
130. Section 362(h) permits an individual harmed by a willful stay violation to recover actual
damages, including costs, attorneys' fees, and possibly punitive damages. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(h)
(1988). When the debtor informs the creditor of the filing and of the stay's commencement, any
subsequent action by that creditor in violation of the stay becomes willful for the purposes of
Section 362(h). See In re Bloom, 875 F.2d 224, 227 (9th Cir. 1989) (explaining that "[a] willful
violation does not require a specific intent to violate the automatic stay. Rather, the statute pro-
vides for damages upon a finding that the defendant knew of the automatic stay and that the
defendant's actions which violated the stay were intentional").
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terrents to stay violations.13 1
Further, once a creditor has notice of the filing, a court could rea-
sonably estop the creditor from gaining a benefit by violating a stay of
which it was clearly aware.'12 Under this view, then, once a debtor
transfers the pertinent information, the void-voidable question is moot.
The debtor has acted properly, thereby avoiding the need for imposi-
tion of a penalty.13 3 By combining the equitable concept of estoppel
with the deterrent effects of contempt and Section 362(h), the second
guideline is met. Therefore, since creditors cannot gain an advantage by
violating the stay and would only incur serious penalties, notice alters
creditor behavior.
In regard to the third standard, the cost to the debtor of both ob-
taining and transferring information concerning its bankruptcy filing is
not only low, but virtually negligible. The debtor expends no resources
in discovering this information, since it makes the decision to file bank-
ruptcy.3' More importantly, giving timely notice to creditors generally
The Second Circuit, applying the plain meaning rule to the term "individual" used in Section
362(h), held that corporations cannot recover damages under this section. See In re Chateaugay
Corp., 920 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1990). Other courts, however, have held that corporate debtors can
obtain redress under Section 362(h). See In re Atlantic Business & Community Corp., 901 F.2d
325 (3d Cir. 1990); Budget Serv. Co. v. Better Homes of Va., Inc., 804 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1986).
131. See note 81 and accompanying text. At least one court has questioned the deterrent
effect of Section 362(h). See Williams, 124 Bankr. at 317. The Williams court arguea that Section
362(h) applies only to willful violations, that it does not provide a remedy for corporate debtors,
and that the low level of damages usually afforded under this section provides little deterrent
effect. Id. As to the first argument, since the voidable rule results in the debtor giving notice to
creditors, a court could reasonably view any subsequent creditor action as prima facie evidence
that the violation was "willful." As to the second argument, the trend in the caselaw seems to
support application of Section 362(h) to corporate debtors. See note 130. Regardless, the contempt
power still protects corporate debtors. See note 129.
Finally, the Williams court's contention that in the past Section 362(h) has resulted in low
damage recoveries does not necessarily apply under a voidable rule. If courts are assured that
virtually all creditors have knowledge of the stay, as the information-forcing effect of the voidable
rule guarantees, then higher levels of damages and imposition of punitive damages would be far
more likely. Moreover, the contempt power of the court still remains a secondary protection.
132. Section 105(a) provides courts with the power to issue whatever order is necessary to
carry out the provisions of the Code. See Smith Corset Shops, Inc., 696 F.2d at 976 (stating that
"[tihere is an overriding consideration that equitable principles govern the exercise of bankruptcy
jurisdiction") (quoting with approval Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 103 (1966)); In re
Young, 14 Bankr. 809, 812 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1981). See also note 81.
133. Adopting a rule that the debtor's act of giving notice presumptively precludes applica-
tion of the voidable rule is especially appropriate given that "[tihe only thing that the debtor can
do [to prevent creditor action] is to make certain that all entities involved know about the filing of
the bankruptcy case." In re Elder, 12 Bankr. 491, 494 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1981).
134. Therefore, use of penalty default analysis does not result in "reducing the amount of
socially useful information." Ayres and Gertner,,99 Yale L. J. at 107 (cited in note 92). Rather, this
is information a debtor must inevitably acquire in order to enter bankruptcy, and therefore disin-
centive effects are not a concern. See id. (discussing instances involving negligible disincentive
effects).
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results in minimal cost to the debtor's estate. For example, the debtor's
attorney can simply mail a telegram, or, if creditor action is immi-
nent, call creditor's counsel. 136 The cost of a phone call, made immedi-
ately before or after filing, hardly constitutes an unbearable burden on
the debtor.
Finally, with respect to the fourth standard, the caselaw is replete
with examples of debtors who fail to give prompt notice of the bank-
ruptcy filing to their creditors before creditor action occurs in violation
of the stay.13 In fact, even when a debtor's main motivation for filing
bankruptcy is halting specific creditor action, such as a scheduled fore-
closure sale, many debtors still fail to provide proper notice. 3 8 Given
the frequency of such cases, the creation of information-forcing incen-
tives for debtors seems necessary.
Because all of the applicable standards are met, applying a penalty
default rule in the stay violation context is appropriate.3 9 The voidable
rule cannot be termed an actual penalty default rule, however, given
that neither debtors nor creditors are able to contract around the Bank-
ruptcy Code 14 0 . Nevertheless, the operation of the voidable rule is still
analogous to the operation of penalty default rules in general, and the
same information-forcing justifications apply.1
4
1
The analogous reasoning involved in the punitive function of the
voidable rule is straightforward. If a debtor does not give notice to its
135. See Weintraub and Resnick, Bankruptcy Law Manual § 1.0911] at 1-49 (cited in note
19) (explaining that if creditor action is about to occur, "the debtor's attorney should notify the
creditor's attorney by mail or telegram instead of waiting for the clerk to send out notices").
136. See In re Clark, 79 Bankr. 723, 724 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987), in which the debtor's
attorney called the creditor's counsel. In this example, however, the debtor's attorney waited until
five days after filing to give notice, and called on the afternoon of the fifth day, knowing that a
foreclosure sale had been scheduled for that morning. See id. This was not, therefore, timely no-
tice. The debtor's attorney should have instead made the call on the day of filing, or at least in
advance of the sale.
137. See, for example, Smith Corset Shops, 696 F.2d at 973-74 (involving a tenant's eviction
and removal of his inventory by the sheriff in violation of the stay, in which the creditor did not
receive notice until almost a month after filing); Ward, 74 Bankr. at 466 (involving a mortgage
foreclosure and sheriff's sale in violation of the stay, in which the creditor did not receive notice
prior to the sale, 15 days after filing, even though debtor had been aware of the impending sale for
months); Oliver, 38 Bankr. at 248-49 (holding the void rule inapplicable since the debtor failed to
give notice for almost seven months after filing); Lampkin, 116 Bankr. at 451 (involving a debtor
who filed bankruptcy the day before the scheduled foreclosure sale of his property, and failed to
notify creditors). For further examples of factual circumstances in which prompt notice could have
prevented creditor action in violation of the stay, see Smith, 876 F.2d at 525; Clark, 79 Bankr. at
724; Sikes, 881 F.2d at 177 (involving a tort claim that arose almost three years prior to filing).
138. See, for example, Lampkin, 116 Bankr. at 451 (explained in note 137).
139. See notes 124-25.
140. For an interesting proposal advocating a bankruptcy system in which debtors would
indeed be able to contract around the Code, see Robert K. Rassmussen, Debtor's Choice: A Menu
Approach to Bankruptcy, 71 Tex. L. Rev. (forthcoming, November 1992).
141. In accord, see notes 124-25.
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creditors immediately before or after filing its bankruptcy petition, and
creditor action subsequently occurs in violation of the stay, then the
court will apply the voidable rule. It does not necessary follow, how-
ever, that bankruptcy courts will hold every stay violation that occurs
without proper notice valid.14 2 Rather, the bankruptcy court will make
a determination of voidability based upon the equities of the situa-
tion.143 The evidentiary burdens placed upon the debtor under such a
rule instead reveal the punitive component of the voidable rule. These
burdens compel the debtor to expend its resources in convincing the
bankruptcy court that it should nullify the creditor action in ques-
tion. 1 44 Most debtors, having neither the time nor the funds to spend on
such burdensome concerns, will instead choose to opt out of the penalty
default. Since debtors can only effectuate this choice by giving creditors
proper notice, the voidable rule will thus operate to facilitate an effi-
cient, low-cost information transfer between debtor and creditor. The
debtor not only becomes fully protected once it gives notice, thus up-
holding the protective functions of the automatic stay, 45 but society as
a whole is also better off because fewer resources are wasted as a result
of uninformed creditor action.
46
The most likely response of the void rule proponents to this analy-
sis is that the protective purposes of the stay are far too important to
the goals of bankruptcy to allow a court to consider any thought of
costs or burdens upon the debtor in connection with automatic stay
analysis. In other words, they would argue that the stay is absolute, and
that courts should therefore treat the void rule as immutable.
4 7
Treating a legal rule as immutable, however, is justified only if
holding otherwise "would be socially deleterious because parties inter-
nal or external to the [situation] . ..cannot adequately protect them-
142. Courts following the voidable rule are already aware of this fact. See, for example, Oli-
ver, 38 Bankr. at 248 (noting that holding a stay violation to be voidable "is not to say that this
court will not void acts which violate the automatic stay in appropriate circumstances").
143. The voidable courts have demonstrated their ability to make this determination. See
note 78. Given that equitable principles govern in the exercise of bankruptcy jurisdiction, see note
132, this type of determination is not only legitimate, but basic to the role of the bankruptcy court.
144. See Williams, 124 Bankr. at 318 (recognizing that "[t]he 'voidable' rule implicitly im-
poses on the debtor (or trustee) the burden of persuading the court that the transfer should be set
aside"). See also note 10.
145. See notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
146. See generally Johnston, 100 Yale L. J. at 616 (cited in note 96) (discussing the Hadley
consequential damage situation and noting that "[tihe promisee and society must be better off
with such a rule, because the information which the promisee is 'forced' to reveal allows the prom-
isor to take the optimal, fully informed level of precaution"); Bishop, 12 J. Legal Stud. at 263
(cited in note 101) (stating that the "[flailure of victims to take cheap precautions that would
contribute to avoidance is wasteful of resources").
147. See Ayres and Gertner, 99 Yale L. J. at 87 (cited in note 92) (defining immutable rules
as "rules [that] govern even if the parties attempt to contract around them").
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selves. ' 148 With this justification as a starting point, there are several
reasons courts should not grant the void rule immutable status. First,
the voidable rule does not render debtors defenseless. By giving credi-
tors timely notice of filing, debtors are able to construct a strong barri-
cade against violations of the stay.14 9 Since a debtor can effectively
protect itself from creditors by its own action, application of an immu-
table rule seems both redundant and wasteful.
Second, use of the voidable rule provides tangible benefits to both
creditors 50 and society as a whole. 51 Furthermore, these benefits are
achieved with only negligible cost imposition on the debtor.152 These do
not seem to be the type of "socially deleterious" results necessary to
justify the imposition of a rigidly immutable rule.
Finally, the demand for the classification of the void rule as immu-
table is essentially based on the conceptualization of the automatic stay
as all-encompassing and all-powerful. 53 Such a conceptualization, how-
ever, is simply thin "judicial gloss."'5 4 The law-and-economics move-
ment has battled for years to curb the use of immutable rules.
55
Further, various legal commentators have already recognized and em-
braced the major role that costs and incentives play in bankruptcy dis-
charge analysis. 56 The time has come to recognize the similarly
important role that costs and incentives play within the arena of the
"all-powerful" automatic stay.
Undoubtedly, some difficulties will develop with the adoption of
the voidable rule. Any change in legal rules is costly during the transi-
tion period. 57 Moreover, problems may arise in situations such as tort
cases in which the debtor is not aware of the identity of all of its possi-
ble creditors. 58 Nevertheless, these issues can be resolved. Utilization
148. Id. at 88 (discussing immutability in a contractual context).
149. See notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
150. The value to creditors of prompt notice is the savings in both resources and opportunity
costs that the creditor would have lost had it commenced an action only to have a court later
negate it due to the stay's operation.
151. See note 146 and accompanying text.
152. See notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
153. For examples of this type of conceptualization, see notes 2 and 31.
154. See note 39.
155. See Ayres and Gertner, 99 Yale L. J. at 89 (cited in note 92) (stating that "[t]he law-
and-economics movement has fought long and hard to convince courts to restrict the use of immu-
table rules") (footnote omitted).
156. See note 41.
157. See Ayres and Gertner, 99 Yale L. J. at 128 n. 179 (cited in note 92) (explaining that
"[a] legal change from one default to another can be costly - especially if the move is to a penalty
default. Until parties become informed about the new default, there may be transitional costs").
158. In mass tort cases, giving notice by means reasonably designed to inform the majority of
possible claimants may be sufficient to opt out of the penalty default. In accordance, see Vancou-
ver Women's Health Soc. v. A. H. Robins Co., 820 F.2d 1359, 1364 (4th Cir. 1987). In individual
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of the voidable rule will result in substantial benefits with only minimal
costs. Such a result strongly supports the adoption of the voidable rule.
2. The Automatic Stay and Moral Hazard
The concept of moral hazard, borrowed from insurance terminol-
ogy, provides another justification for the voidable rule. When fully in-
sured, one no longer bears the economic consequences of loss.'59 As a
result, the insured's incentives to avoid risk and to take precautions
against loss are significantly reduced. 60 This phenomenon is known as
moral hazard, and commentators agree that it is pervasive throughout
the economy.1
Moral hazard is basically a function of economic rationality. 6 2 An
example may help to illustrate this principle. An entrepreneur owns a
warehouse which is only seasonally operated. Defective wiring in the
warehouse is a hazard that greatly increases the risk of fire.6 3 Without
insurance, the entrepreneur has a strong incentive to have the wiring
fixed because she bears the full cost of any accident. If the warehouse is
fully insured, however, so that the entrepreneur no longer bears the risk
of loss, she may choose not to spend her own money to have the wiring
fixed. Rather, the entrepreneur may reason that insurance will cover
any costs associated with fire. Furthermore, not expending money to fix
the wiring will increase the entrepreneur's profits.6 The entrepreneur's
decision not to fix the wiring, therefore, is economically rational be-
cause the existence of insurance has rendered the benefit derived from
any repair work negligible. Therefore, the moral hazard of failing to
tort cases, the debtor will often be aware of the identity of the claimant, given the individualized
nature of these cases. If a claimant's identity is unknown, equity may dictate application of the
voidable rule anyway. See Sikes v. Global Marine, Inc., 881 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1989) (addressing a
tort claim filed postpetition).
159. See Carol A. Heimer, Reactive Risk and Rational Action: Managing Moral Hazard in
Insurance Contracts 35 (Univ. of Cal., 1985).
160. See id. See also Richard Arnott and Joseph Stiglitz, The Welfare Economics of Moral
Hazard in Henri Louberge, ed., Risk, Information and Insurance 91-92 (Kluwer Academic, 1990).
161. See id. at 91 (stating that "[i]t is now widely recognized that the phenomenon of moral
hazard, which arises whenever risk-averse individuals obtain insurance and their accident avoid-
ance activities cannot be perfectly monitored, is pervasive in the economy") (footnote omitted).
162. Contrary to what the term might suggest, moral hazard does not necessarily involve
questions of morality or character. This common assumption is discussed in Heimer, Reactive Risk
at 35 (noting that "[t]he insurance literature most often discusses moral hazard as if it were a
question of character"). Instead, see id. at 35-37 (discussing the reasons that moral hazard is a
function of economic rationality).
163. The basic idea for this example was suggested by id. at 29.
164. For the sake of simplicity, I am assuming in this example that there is no personal
danger to the entrepreneur or any of her employees from a fire, that warehouses of equivalent
economic value are essentially fungible goods, and that the transactional costs associated with
purchasing a new warehouse are minimal.
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take precautions against the possibility of accidents can be an economi-
cally rational response for a fully insured individual.
Legal scholars have already recognized moral hazard as an inherent
consequence of the debtor's right to discharge.1 6 5 What has not yet been
considered, however, is the void rule's creation of an equally powerful
moral hazard problem. Absolute application of the void rule is analo-
gous to full insurance. If a debtor knows that every violation of the stay
is void, it has no incentive to give creditors notice once it files its bank-
ruptcy petition. In fact, its failure to give notice is economically ra-
tional. 6 In effect, the void rule fully insures the debtor against stay
violations, and the debtor therefore has a perverse incentive to remain
silent. Thus, the problems associated with the void rule are apparent.
6 7
Insurers generally solve the problem of moral hazard through the
use of copayment mechanisms. These copayment mechanisms induce
precautions by placing certain burdens upon the insured. 6 Application
of the voidable rule is analogous to compelling individuals to make
copayments in order to obtain insurance protection. By assessing a pen-
alty for failure to provide timely notice, the penalty being the burden of
proving that the court should nullify the creditor action, the voidable
rule creates strong incentives for the debtor to act responsibly from the
outset. This incentive, in turn, acts to eliminate moral hazard. There-
fore, the function of the voidable rule as an analogous copayment mech-
anism also justifies. its adoption.
VI. CONCLUSION
The automatic stay is undeniably an important part of bankruptcy
law. This importance, however, does not necessarily override all other
goals, or resolve all other questions. Thus far, the void-voidable debate
has been a continual and repetitive clash between the purposivistic
need for debtor protection and the textualist demand for accuracy and
horizontal coherence. In order to effectively resolve this issue, however,
courts need to move beyond this limited argumentative arena.
Through application of the penalty aspects of the voidable rule, the
efficient transfer of information can be achieved while preserving the
important protective purposes of the stay. Not only will the proper in-
165. See Keating, 45 Vand. L. Rev. at 126 (footnote omitted) (cited in note 3) (commenting
that "[t]he notion of discharge as insurance highlights the reality that discharge presents a moral
hazard for debtors"). See also Jackson, 98 Harv. L. Rev. at 1428 n.114 (cited in note 41).
166. In accord, see note 162.
167. For examples of this scenario, see note 137.
168. See Jackson, 98 Harv. L. Rev. at 1428 n.114 (stating that "[iun order to minimize moral
hazard, most [insurance] policies contain deductibles or other means of coinsurance"); Keating, 45
Vand. L. Rev. at 126-27.
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centives induce debtors to give creditors timely notice of filing, but
wasteful creditor action will also be avoided, and the moral hazard in-
trinsic to the void rule will be eliminated. The time has come, therefore,
to adopt the voidable rule, and thereby to accept the vital role that
information and incentives play in the operation of the automatic stay.
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